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Abstract 
In 2012, the United Nations approved new Guidelines on the Use of Armed Private Security 
Companies by its agencies, funds and programmes. The Guidelines hold the potential to 
not only enhance the quality of armed security services contracted by the UN, but also 
raise professional standards within the military and security industry more generally by 
serving as a model for other consumers and companies. Nevertheless, a close reading of 
the Guidelines indicates that there is still room for improvements. Drawing on best 
practices identified by industry associations, major clients and academic research, this 
article makes six recommendations for revision. Specifically, the article contends that 
expanding the scope, content and enforcement of the Guidelines would contribute to 
strengthening the control over private security contractors. 
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[476] Introduction 
United Nations (UN) agencies, funds and programmes have employed Private Security 
Companies (PSCs), i.e. firms which provide static and mobile protection, for many years. 
Nevertheless, little was known about this practice until recently.1 In 2010, a report by the 
UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries noted that the UN was ‘using the services of 
private military and security personnel in some of the conflict zones in which it is 
engaged’.2 Subsequent UN publications acknowledged the contracting of PSCs for ‘guard 
services for United Nations offices, residential security for staff, and support for 
humanitarian activities, including risk assessments, threat analysis, logistical support and 
contributing to the development of security strategy’.3 The controversy which has 
surrounded the employment of PSCs during the international interventions in Iraq and 
Afghanistan has contributed to the reticence of the UN to make public its growing reliance 
on PSCs. High profile incidents, such as the shooting of 17 Iraqi civilians by employees of 
the American PSC Blackwater, have given the industry a bad name. The lack of binding 
international regulations for the global security industry remains a cause for concern.  
To address these issues and prevent reputational damage to its agencies and 
operations the UN has adopted new Guidelines on the Use of Armed Guards. These 
guidelines hold the potential to not only enhance the quality of security services 
contracted by the UN, but also raise professional standards within the industry more 
generally by serving as a model for other consumers and companies. However, academic 
research and contracting best practices identified by industry associations and major 
clients such as the United States (US) suggest that there is considerable room for 
improvements. In the following, this article identifies six areas related to scope, content 
and enforcement where revised guidelines could lead to a significant strengthening of the 
                                                                 
1 See Åse Gilje Østensen, UN Use of Private Military and Security Companies: Practices and Policies. SSR Paper 
3 (2011); Lou Pingeot, Dangerous Partnership. Private Military & Security Companies and the UN. Report 
(2012). 
2 See UN, Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impending the Exercise of the Right of 
Peoples to Self-determination (2010), A/65/325, at 10. 
3 See UN, Use of Private Security (2012), A/67/539; UN, Reports on the Department of Safety and Security and 
on the Use of Private Security (2012), A/67/624; UN, Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights 
and Impending the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-determination (2013), A/68/339, at 9. 
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UN’s control over security contractors. Notwithstanding these recommendations, it should 
be noted that improved guidelines and management cannot address [477] all 
apprehensions that have been expressed with regard to the proliferation of PSCs in 
international interventions and areas of conflict. The impacts of PSCs on the laws of war, 
the state monopoly on violence, combatant demobilization, disarmament and 
reintegration, and public control and accountability, touch upon broader societal concerns 
which go beyond regulation and the scope of this article.4 
 
UN Guidelines on the Use of Armed Guards 
The UN’s Guidelines on the Use of Armed Private Security Companies (APSC Guidelines) 
which were approved in November 2012 consist of four elements.5 The UN Security 
Management System (UNSMS) Security Policy Manual contains a section on ‘Armed Private 
Security Companies’ (APSCs) which sets out general policies for the employment of armed 
security contractors by UN agencies, funds and programmes. It establishes that the use of 
armed security contractors ‘may be considered only when there is no possible provision of 
adequate and appropriate armed security from the host Government, alternate member 
State(s), or internal United Nations system resources’.6 APSCs hired by the UN are required 
to provide confirmation, in writing, of compliance with a mandatory screening process and 
asked to develop and implement company policies on the use of force, firearms 
management and weapons manuals. These policies must conform to the national laws of 
the home and host states, be as or more restrictive than the UN ‘Use of Force Policy’ and 
‘Instruction on Use of Force Equipment’, and should be consistent with the International 
Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC).7 In addition, the UNSMS 
Security Policy Manual identifies general training, management and oversight conditions. 
                                                                 
4 See, for instance, Deborah Avant, Markets for Force (2005); Elke Krahmann, States, Citizens and the 
Privatization of Security (2010); Cateri Carmola, Private Security Companies and the New Wars (2010); Anna 
Leander, ed. The Commercialization of Security in Europe: Consequences for Peace and Reconciliation (2013); 
James Pattison, The Morality of Private War (2014). 
5 See UN, Reports on the Department of Safety and Security and on the Use of Private Security (2012), 
A/67/624, at 8. 
6 See UN, UN Security Management System. Security Policy Manual, Chapter IV, Section 1 (2012), at 1. 
7 Id., at 4. 
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The details of these requirements are set out in a second element: the UNSMS Security 
Management Operations Manual ‘Guidelines on the Use of Armed Security Services from 
Private Security Companies’. [478] They are complemented by advice on a ‘Statement of 
Works for the Use of Armed Private Security Companies’ and a 58-page long ‘Model 
Contract’ for the provision of armed security services.8 
 Two types of security services fall under the APSC Guidelines: static and mobile 
protection. Static guarding services include access control, identification and reporting of 
suspicious persons or objects, monitoring and responding to intrusion, maintaining guard 
post records and preparing incident reports.9 Mobile services cover services such as to 
‘plan and monitor road movements’, ‘present a visible deterrent’, ‘conduct reconnaissance’, 
‘advance and clear routes’ and ‘operate and maintain communications equipment’.10 
Mandatory criteria for the selection of suitable APSCs involve, among others, ICoC 
membership, five years-experience in the supply of armed guards, a valid license in their 
home state, a license to import, carry and use firearms in the host state, and the ability to 
comply with the scope of work.11 Companies must also carry out criminal background 
screening of all armed guards and verify their employment history for the past five years.12 
In addition, an APSC must provide training for its guards on the ICoC, the company’s use 
of force policy and weapons manual as well as on issues such as firearms handling, 
counter-terrorist search, hostile surveillance and reconnaissance, human rights law and its 
applications, integrity and ethical awareness, preventing sexual harassment and an 
overview of the UN security management system as relevant.13 Management and oversight 
include daily operations reviews and monthly performance reviews by UN staff.14 The 
model contract sets out these requirements in detail. 
 
                                                                 
8 See UN, United Nations Security Management System (2012). 
9 See UN, UN Security Management System. Security Management Operations Manual ‘Guidelines on the Use 
of Armed Security Services from Private Security Companies’ (2012), at 2. 
10 Id., at 3. 
11 Id., at 6. 
12 Id., at 7. 
13 Id., at 9. 
14 Id, at 10-11. 
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Areas for Improvement 
The APSC Guidelines are a significant advancement over the UN’s Use of Armed Guards 
policy which has been in place since the publication of the United Nations Field Security 
Handbook in 2006. Its primary requirement was that all contracted security companies had 
to be ‘entitled, pursuant to local law, [479] to provide armed guards and ... fully insured 
and appropriately licensed, so that they can effectively indemnify the organization from 
claims’.15 A sample contract was ‘attached for convenience’ rather than explicit guidance.16 
Nevertheless, the APSC Guidelines are characterized by several limitations because their 
main objective is to minimize ‘reputational risk’ to the UN.17 As a consequence, the APSC 
Guidelines pay no attention to security services other than armed guards; they show 
limited concern for the impact of PSCs on the UN’s security posture and environment; they 
do not realize fully the UN’s potential as a norm entrepreneur in the international 
regulation of PSC services; and they make few provisions to ensure effective 
implementation. In the following, this article makes six recommendations for improvement. 
 
1. Expansion of Scope 
The APSC Guidelines’ restriction to armed security contractors is its most significant 
limitation. This restriction disregards that reputational damage and negative impacts on 
mission objectives and host state populations can be caused by PSCs providing a wide 
range of services, as examples such as contractor involvement in the abuse of prisoners in 
Abu Ghraib or the sex-trafficking scandal of DynCorp during the peacekeeping mission in 
Bosnia illustrate. By focusing exclusively on armed guards, the policy overlooks the 
potential hazards caused by the important contribution of unarmed contractors in a variety 
of functions. Unarmed guards, for instance, provide a strategic interface between UN 
missions and local populations in many countries. The habitus and behaviour of these 
                                                                 
15 See UN, United Nations Field Security Handbook (2006), Annex O ‘Use of Armed Guards’, at O-1. 
16 Id., footnote 1. 
17 See UN Chief Executives Board (CEB) Conclusions of the Twenty-third Session of the High Level Committee 
on Management (2012), CEB/2012/3, at 5. See also UN CEB, Inter-Agency Security Management Network 
Meeting. 13th Session, Vienna (2010), CEB/2010/HLCM/20, at point 16. 
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guards can have a significant impact on how the UN is perceived by civilian populations.18 
Unarmed security companies are also involved in the operations of UN agencies in other 
ways that have the potential to be abused or cause complaints, e.g. when accompanying 
UN personnel outside protected areas or handling sophisticated technical equipment [480] 
such as surveillance drones.19 In addition, the employment of private military and security 
companies for logistical and management support may involve the UN in controversies or 
impact on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, such as the subcontracting of 
security services with local militias or rebel groups.20 
The limitation to armed companies is surprising if one considers that the UN had 
fairly comprehensive guidelines on unarmed security guards in the past. The UN Field 
Security Handbook (1991) and the United Nations Security Operations Manual (1995) both 
included Guard Force Guidelines which prohibited the use of armed PSCs and made 
recommendations for the selection and vetting of companies as well as minimum 
professional standards for unarmed guards and their supervisors.21 Its annexes included a 
Facility Inventory Form, a Guard Recruit Training Subjects list and a suggested In-Service 
Guard Training Subjects list. In 1996, a UN Security Directive permitted the use of armed 
guards in light of the perceived deterioration of the UN’s global working environment. The 
Guard Force Guidelines were not revoked, but had already ‘faded away’ before they were 
formally replaced by the UNSMS (2012).22 
Since the majority of PSCs employed by the UN provide unarmed security services it 
is vital to expand the scope of the guidelines in order to prevent potential scandals and 
limit negative impacts on UN missions, host countries and local populations. Revised 
                                                                 
18 See Peer Schouten, Political Topographies of Private Security in Sub-Saharan Africa, in T. Dietz et al. (Eds.) 
African engagements - Africa Negotiating an Emerging Multipolar World, 56-83 (2011), at 70. 
19 See Perry Chiaramonte, UN Using Drones to Monitor Congo Border, Fleet to Grow This Spring. Fox News, 1 
March 2014, at: http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/03/01/un-using-drones-to-monitor-congo-border-
fleet-to-grow-this-spring/.  
20 Although there is no known example among UN contractors, local security firms employed by the US 
government in Afghanistan have been suspected of having paid the Taliban and local warlords to gain 
protection for military supply convoys. See United States Senate 2010: Inquiry into the Role and Oversight of 
Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan. 111th Congress, 2nd Session. Report, 28 September, at:  
https://info.publicintelligence.net/SASC-PSC-Report.pdf. 
21 See UN, United Nations Security Operations Manual. Guard Force Guidelines (1995). 
22 Interview with Stuart Groves, Geneva, 5 March 2014.  
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guidelines would be more effective if they applied to all companies which supply military 
and security services to the UN, including, but not limited to, services such as ‘armed 
guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other 
places; maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to 
or training of local forces and security personnel’.23 Expanding the scope of the UN 
guidelines would not only fill the gap caused by the abolition of the Guard [481] Force 
Guidelines, but also bring the UN in line with best practice suggested by the Montreux 
Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States 
related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict.24 
The Montreux Document was signed in 2008 and, so far, has gained support from 50 UN 
member states as well as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union and 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.25 
 
2. Specification of Conditions for the Use of Security Guards 
A second area for improvement concerns the development of stricter conditions for the 
use of private security guards. Although the APSC Guidelines state that armed guards 
should only be contracted ‘on an exceptional basis’, this policy - which has been in place 
since 1996 - has done little to prevent the extensive employment of security guards by UN 
agencies and missions.26 One reason for the proliferation of contract guards is the APSC 
Guideline’s incorrect assumption that ‘armed security services will normally be provided by 
alternate member States or the appropriate security entity within the United Nations 
system’ if a host state should be unable or unwilling to protect UN staff and facilities.27 In 
reality, many member states are reluctant to provide police or military personnel to guard 
                                                                 
23 See Montreux Document (2009), at 9, http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0996.pdf. 
24 Id. 
25 See Participating States of the Montreux Document, 
http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/intla/humlaw/pse/parsta.html. In contrast, the association for 
the implementation of the ICoC, which is taken as standard by the APSC Guidelines and restricts its remit to 
the providers of static and mobile protection, has only been joined by six member states so far. See ICoCA, 
Membership, 
http://www.icoca.ch/en/membership?states_governments=states&op=Search&view_type=map&form_id=_se
arch_for_members_filter_form. 
26 Id. 
27 See UN, UN Security Management System. Security Policy Manual, Chapter IV, Section 1 (2012), at 1. 
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UN facilities and personnel because they receive little credit for such services in 
comparison with peacekeeping operations. Also peacekeeping forces loath delegating 
soldiers for guarding duties because they consider the protection of UN personnel and 
facilities outside their regular mandates. Few countries, such as Romania, Nepal, Fiji, Jordan 
and Morocco, take pride in volunteering military or police contingents to ensure the safety 
of UN missions. Although permanent UN security staff could be deployed abroad, this 
option is considered too expensive by UN security managers because international security 
staff are paid higher rates in the field [482] and replacements would have to be hired to fill 
their current positions.28 Local security guards employed as permanent UN staff are 
cheaper, but they require selection, vetting and training, and are impractical for temporary 
missions.29 
A second cause for the rise in the number of private security guards employed by 
the UN is the use of Security Risk Assessment to determine whether there is a need for 
armed guards. This practice is perpetuated by the new APSC Guidelines.30 Security Risk 
Assessments are part of the UN’s Security Risk Management Process which was introduced 
in 2004.31 In contrast to the threat analyses which were carried out before 2004, Security 
Risk Management assesses not only threats, but also the potential vulnerabilities of UN 
facilities and missions. By factoring vulnerability into security assessments, however, 
Security Risk Management has a tendency to justify a precautionary use of guards in many 
circumstances. Even where the likelihood of an attack is very low Security Risk 
Management can defend the employment of guards because they help to address 
potential weak points in the UN’s defences.32 
 Revised APSC Guidelines cannot address all these issues. Foremost, member states 
should realize that the UN requires adequate resources and support to ensure the security 
                                                                 
28 See Rick Cottam, UN Working Group on Mercenaries – Panel Event ‘Use of Private Military and Security 
Companies by the United Nations’, Geneva, 5 March 2014; interview with a representative of the Department 
of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), 2 April 2014, New York. 
29 See interview with a representative of DPKO, 2 April 2014, New York. 
30 See UN, UN Security Management System. Security Policy Manual, Chapter IV, Section 1 (2012), at 2. 
31 See UNSECOORD, Security Risk Management, 24 June (2004), at 1, 4, 5. 
32 See Elke Krahmann, Beck and Beyond: Selling Security in the World Risk Society. 37:1 Review of 
International Studies 349-372 (2011). 
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of its operations and staff. The UN could do more to make member states recognize this 
fact by identifying security as a separate budget line for all its agencies, funds and 
programmes. The reluctance of some UN agencies to reveal how much they are spending 
on security has allowed member states to assume that security is not a major item.33 
Exposing the true cost of security would contribute to putting pressure on member states 
to make more funds available for the employment of additional UN security staff or to 
volunteer national police and military personnel for guarding duties. By emphasizing the 
cost and importance of security, the UN would also raise the profile and international 
recognition received by countries which second guards for UN missions and operations. So 
would the creation of a dedicated UN Guard Force, drawn from a roster of personnel 
supplied by member states, [483] which has been discussed in UN circles.34 A standing UN 
Guard Force could build on the examples of special guard force contingents which have 
protected the UN missions in Iraq and Somalia. In the meantime, it would be important to 
clarify and restrict the circumstances in which armed and unarmed security guards may be 
deployed. New guidelines could achieve this by identifying minimum threat levels, which 
are established by the UN’s regular threat assessments, above which the use of unarmed 
and armed security guards may be considered. Such a rule would prevent that guards are 
used to address perceived vulnerabilities where the probability of harm is low. More 
generally, it seems advisable to restructure the UN Security Risk Management approach in 
such a way as to establish threat levels before analysing vulnerabilities in order to ensure 
that mitigating measures are only implemented where necessary. 
 
3. Specification of Standards and Training Requirements 
The APSC Guidelines contain an extensive list of professional standards and training 
requirements for companies employed by the UN. Nevertheless, they, too, can be 
improved in two respects. The first improvement concerns the requirement that an APSC 
must be a ‘member company to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security 
                                                                 
33 See interview with Stuart Groves, Geneva, 5 March 2014.  
34 See interview with a representative of DPKO, 2 April 2014, New York. 
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Services Providers’ (ICoC).35 In this context, it is important to note the creation of the ICoC 
Association (ICoCA) in 2013 as an organization responsible for certifying PSCs which 
formally comply with the ICoC. This development has reduced the signing of the ICoC to a 
mere voluntary commitment, compared to certified membership in the ICoCA. So far, 708 
PSCs have signed up to the ICoC, but only 133 companies have joined the ICoCA which is 
still in the process of finalizing its certification mechanisms.36 Even when the ICoCA has set 
up processes for certifying and monitoring compliance, the imprecision and limited value 
added of the ICoC beyond existing national and international laws and the inability of the 
ICoCA to impose sanctions other than exclusion raise questions about the benefits of [484] 
making membership a requirement for UN security contractors.37 The second area for 
improvement regards the specification of minimum training requirements for UN security 
contractors. While the APSC Guidelines demand that companies provide training on a wide 
range of issues, including use of force, human rights law, ethics and sexual harassment, 
they leave it up to each contractor to determine the scope and content of the training. 
Moreover, APSCs decide and ‘certify’ whether their employees have ‘demonstrated the 
necessary of level of skill’ in these fields.38 Since contractors seek to reduce costs even 
industry associations, such as the Confederation of European Security Services, warn that 
the failure to detail training requirements can lead to a race to the bottom.39  
In order to ensure professional standards and training revised APSC Guidelines 
should, therefore, not rely on ICoC membership or ICoCA certification. Also accreditation 
                                                                 
35 See UN, UN Security Management System. Security Policy Manual, Chapter IV, Section 1 (2012), at 6. The 
Model Contract is confusing in respect to the ICoC. It requires that an APSC ‘complies’ with the ICoC, but the 
company need not be a ‘signatory’ to the code. Moreover, the Model Contract demands that a company 
should be ‘certified’ under the code, while the Security Policy Manual does not. See UN, UN Security 
Management System. Security Management Operations Manual ‘Guidelines on the Use of Armed Security 
Services from Private Security Companies – Annex B – Model Contract’ (2012), at 12. 
36 See ICoCA, Get Involved, http://www.icoca.ch/en/get-involved. 
37 See Rebecca DeWinter-Schmitt (ed.) Montreux Five Years On: An Analysis of State Efforts to Implement 
Montreux Document Legal Obligations and Good Practices, (2013), http://ihrib.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/MontreuxFv31.pdf; Corinna Seiberth, Private Military and Security Companies in 
International Law (2014). 
38 See UN, UN Security Management System. Security Management Operations Manual ‘Guidelines on the Use 
of Armed Security Services from Private Security Companies’ (2012), at 9. 
39 See CoESS and Uni-Europa, Selecting Best Value – A Manual for Organisations Awarding Contracts for 
Private Guarding Services (2000), at 1, 
http://www.coess.org/_Uploads/dbsAttachedFiles/Best_Value_Manual_EN%281%29.pdf. 
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by the International Standards Organization (ISO) in the new Management System for 
Quality of Private Security Company (PSC) Operations would achieve little since the ISO 
standard only concerns management procedures, not the training or operations of security 
guards.40 The UN would be better placed by defining its own minimum standards for the 
professional conduct and training of security guards. By doing so, the UN would fulfil its 
function as an international role model. Best practice is already illustrated by the APSC 
Guideline’s stipulation that contracted companies must develop and implement use of 
force and firearms management policies which are ‘as or more restrictive’ than the UN’s 
own policies.41 Another good example is the UN’s zero tolerance policy on sexual 
exploitation which is included in the Model [485] Statement of Works and Model 
Contract.42 Best practice in the definition of training standards for security guards is 
demonstrated by the World Wide Protective Services Contracts awarded by the US 
government. Among others, these contracts detail the content of security training, 
including a Department of Defense-defined curriculum; hours of the programme of 
instruction; proficiency standards; and certified training institutions.43 Compliance with 
training standards must be ‘demonstrated’ by the US security contractor rather than 
merely self-certified.  
 
4. Expansion of Contract Management Capabilities in the Field 
The UN’s contracting and contractor management processes in the field as envisaged by 
the ASPC Guidelines and structured by the UN Security Management System can also be 
                                                                 
40 See International Standards Organization (ISO), ISO/PC 284 Management system for quality of private 
security company (PSC) operations, http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_technical_committee?commid=4857900.  
41 Id., at 4. Ironically, the UN also demands that a company’s firearms and use of force policy must comply 
with the ICoC, although the ICoC identifies the ‘United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and 
Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (1990)’ and compliance with national laws as its own minimum 
standard. 
42 See UN, UN Security Management System. Security Management Operations Manual ‘Guidelines on the Use 
of Armed Security Services from Private Security Companies – Annex A – Statement of Works, at 7; UN, UN 
Security Management System. Security Management Operations Manual ‘Guidelines on the Use of Armed 
Security Services from Private Security Companies – Annex B – Model Contract’ (2012), at 57. 
43 See US, Triple Canopy - World Wide Protective Services Contract (2011), 
http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/industry_initiatives/contracts/dos_contract_triplecanopy_s-aqmpgd-05-
d-1100_award.pdf. 
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improved. One field for improvement concerns the selection of APSCs and their 
employees. With regard to criteria, such as minimum years of operation, age, training and 
criminal records checks for individual security guards, the APSC Guidelines rely exclusively 
on the company’s written confirmation.44 A second area for possible improvement regards 
the management of security guards. UN security officers responsible for the management 
and inspection of contract guards have no direct authority over them. If a UN security 
guard force manager observes a deficiency or misconduct, he or she must report to their 
supervisor or company headquarters in order to ask for the problem to be addressed. 
Finally, there is the issue of monitoring. The ASPC Guideline’s rules for the supervision of 
security guards are very extensive, including daily, weekly and monthly inspections by field 
security officers or the security cell.45 Considering that the list of daily checks includes 
twelve items, such as safe storage of equipment; physical condition of security [486] posts, 
stations and personnel; and quality of responses to spot test training questions and 
readiness drills, however, it is doubtful whether field security staff will have sufficient time 
to carry out these additional inspections and whether checks will be very thorough.46 US 
experience from multilateral interventions shows that contractor management often takes 
a backseat to other duties, in particular in volatile environments where contract guards are 
most likely to be used.47 Moreover, security officers are often untrained in issues of 
contractor oversight or, as noted above, lack direct authority over contractors. 
To remedy these matters the guidelines should make provisions for spot checks of 
companies and their employees as well as the verification of training, and tighten security 
contractor management by giving more authority to field security officers. The effective 
implementation of the guidelines also requires additional qualified staff and resources. For 
the vetting of local security staff where public criminal records have been destroyed or lost 
the UN could use databases from UN War Crimes Tribunals and the ICC which include lists 
                                                                 
44 See UN, UN Security Management System. Security Management Operations Manual ‘Guidelines on the Use 
of Armed Security Services from Private Security Companies’ (2012), at 6-7. 
45 See UN, UN Security Management System. Security Management Operations Manual ‘Guidelines on the Use 
of Armed Security Services from Private Security Companies’ (2012), at 10. 
46 Id., at 10-11. 
47 See Government Accountability Office (GAO), Operational Contract Support: Management and Oversight 
Improvements Needed in Afghanistan. GAO 12-290 (2012).  
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of military units, paramilitary groups and police units.48 For security contractor 
management the UN should allocate additional personnel. Best practice is suggested by 
the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) which has reviewed extensively the 
problem of security contractor management in multilateral military interventions.49 Among 
others, GAO advocates that ‘Reliance on private security contractors should be 
accompanied by greater use and emphasis on vetting, training, authorizing arms, and 
weapons control; post-convoy debriefing, locational tracking, and video monitoring; and 
more thorough and comprehensive management’.50 In addition, GAO recommends the 
hiring or training of specialized contract management personnel who can be deployed 
[487] with international missions.51 The UN can learn from these recommendations. Rather 
than expecting field security officers to carry out extensive monitoring of PSCs, contractor 
management should be recognized as a separate function. Contract managers should have 
relevant security service and management expertise in order to carry out contractor 
selection, contract design, contractor performance reviews and contractor management. In 
order to operate effectively they and field security officers also need direct authority over 
contractor personnel. 
 
5. Performance Reviews Focused on Security Outcomes 
Suitable performance measures are an important factor in the monitoring of security 
contractors. The performance criteria identified in the APSC Guidelines, however, are 
characterized by a common weakness.52 They assess quality of service, cost, timeliness and 
                                                                 
48 See Rick Cottam, UN Working Group on Mercenaries – Panel Event ‘Use of Private Military and Security 
Companies by the United Nations’, Geneva, 5 March 2014. 
49 See GAO, Contract Security Guards: Army’s Guard Program Requires Greater Oversight and Reassessment of 
Acquisitions Approach, GAO-06-284 (2006); GAO, Military Operations: High-Level DOD Action Needed to 
Address Long-standing Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces. 
GAO 07-145 (2006); GAO, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Conditions in Iraq Are Conductive to Fraud, Waste 
and Abuse. GAO 07-525T (2007); GAO, Operational Contract Support: Management and Oversight 
Improvements Needed in Afghanistan. GAO 12-290 (2012). 
50 See GAO, Contingency Contracting: Agency Actions to Address Recommendations by the Commission on 
Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. GAO 12-854R (2012), at 12. 
51 Id., at 10. 
52 See Elke Krahmann, Input, Output, Performance and Performativity: PMSCs and the Legitimacy of Security. 
International BISA-ISA Conference, Edinburgh, 20-22 Mai (2012). 
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business relations, but not the achievement of results.53 The UN, thereby, disregards the 
main purpose of ‘performance’ assessments which is to measure ‘results, not activity’.54 By 
focusing on services rather than outcomes, the APSC Guidelines neglect to investigate the 
impacts of contract security services.55 These impacts can include intended results, such as 
fewer attacks on UN facilities and decreased theft. However, the contracting of PSCs can 
also have unintended consequences, such as the alienation of local populations and the 
rearmament of militias in a different form.56  
Improved guidelines for the use of security contractors should, therefore, include 
performance criteria which assess results as well as services. Admittedly, security is not an 
outcome that is easily measurable or attributable. Research suggests three measures of 
security which can be used to capture a [488] diverse range of intended and unintended 
outcomes.57 Since each measure has its advantages and disadvantages, they are best used 
in combination. The first measure is provided by statistical changes in the frequency of 
crime or violence against UN facilities and staff. Although these statistics have to be 
evaluated in light of a particular security situation and threat environment, they can 
provide direct evidence for the effectiveness of specific security services and companies. A 
second measure concerns the subjective perceptions of security and insecurity among UN 
personnel and local civilians in response to contractors’ presence and activities. This 
measure does not grasp the impact of security contractors on potential threats to UN 
facilities. However, it identifies important positive and negative consequences for the UN’s 
general security environment, e.g. if contractors are considered a threat to public security. 
Surveys among UN staff and local users of UN services also serve as an early warning 
system for problems which can affect the operation and reputation of the UN, such as 
                                                                 
53 See UN, UN Security Management System. Security Management Operations Manual ‘Guidelines on the Use 
of Armed Security Services from Private Security Companies – Annex A – Statement of Works, at 8-9. 
54 See US Army, Developing a Performance Work Statement in a Deployed Environment, Handbook 09-48 
(2009), at 4, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/09-48/09-48.pdf. 
55 An assessment of ‘potential negative impacts’ is only carried out in the application for a use of armed 
security guards. See UN, UN Security Management System. Security Management Operations Manual 
‘Guidelines on the Use of Armed Security Services from Private Security Companies’ (2012), at 5. 
56 See Lou Pingeot, Dangerous Partnership. Private Military & Security Companies and the UN. Report (2012), 
at 15. 
57 See Elke Krahmann, Input, Output, Performance and Performativity: PMSCs and the Legitimacy of Security. 
International BISA-ISA Conference, Edinburgh, 20-22 Mai (2012). 
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corruption or harassment by security guards. Finally, the effectiveness of security activities 
and capabilities can be assessed through mock attacks or tests. In contrast to the checks of 
capabilities and personnel specified in the APSC Guidelines, these tests should examine the 
responses of security contractors to situations such as attempted theft, disorder or 
hostilities. 
 
6. Sanctions for Contractor Misperformance and Misconduct 
A final area for improvement concerns the UN’s responses to contractors which are 
accused of misperformance or misconduct. In most circumstances, the UN envisages that 
‘any performance issues or concerns identified’ can be addressed through ‘remedial 
action’.58 In cases where such action is not possible, the Model Contract identifies three 
types of sanctions. Firstly, the UN can require reimbursements for any damage caused to 
the UN because of the failure to conform to the contract.59 Secondly, the UN can demand 
the withdrawal or replacement of any contractor staff at any time.60 Thirdly, the UN can 
terminate the contract.61 A main disadvantage of these stipulations is that they leave [489] 
little room for a graduated response. If contract termination or the replacement of guards 
are the only alternatives remedial action is likely to be considered the sole practicable 
option in most instances. Requiring contractors to make merely amendments, however, 
can give the impression that companies have little to fear from accusations of weak 
performance or misconduct. The lack of a penalty may tempt PSCs to cut costs wherever 
possible, even if this has a negative effect on their services or standards. Another issue 
concerns the Model Contract’s ambiguity on the kinds or levels of misperformance or 
misconduct which will trigger sanctions. The Model Contract instead places great emphasis 
on the resolution of disputes between the UN and its contractors over performance issues. 
Without clear stipulations companies and their employees may claim that the UN is acting 
arbitrarily when it terminates a contract or demands the dismissal of personnel.  
                                                                 
58 See UN, UN Security Management System. Security Policy Manual, Chapter IV, Section 1 (2012), at 5. 
59 UN, UN Security Management System. Security Management Operations Manual ‘Guidelines on the Use of 
Armed Security Services from Private Security Companies – Annex B – Model Contract’ (2012), at 35. 
60 Id., 21. 
61 Id. 
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Experience from the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan illustrates the extent of 
contractor fraud, waste and abuse.62 To ensure the effective implementation of the UN’s 
rules on security contractors it is, therefore, imperative that revised guidelines and 
contracts clarify what is considered non-compliance or misconduct and how it will be 
penalized. Best practice is suggested by the US Department of Defense’s Contracting 
Officer’s Representative Handbook and the US World Wide Protective Services Contract. 
The Contracting Officer’s Representative Handbook illustrates that a graduated response 
to non-compliance can utilize at least ten different types of sanctions. Contract managers 
can: (1) invoke relevant contract clauses (stop work, cure notice, show cause, liquidated 
damages, warranty, or termination); (2) withhold or reduce award and incentive fees; (3) 
reject the noncompliant work or allow to rework; (4) suspend progress payments; (5) 
decline to extend the term of the contract; (6) modify the contract; (7) address claims or 
consideration; (8) take legal recourse; (9) use alternative dispute resolution; and (10) 
document the issue in a past performance database.63 Including a wider range of penalties 
in PSC guidelines and contracts would not only enable UN contract managers and field 
security officers to modify and escalate their responses to contractor non-compliance, but 
also impress upon contractors the importance that the UN places on professional 
standards of operation. In order to be effective, however, contacts must clearly specify 
performance standards and relevant [490] penalties. The World Wide Protective Services 
Contracts illustrate how sub-standard performance or behaviour can be defined in order to 
clarify when sanctions can be imposed. The contract’s detailed ‘Standards of Conduct’ for 
security guards regulate, among others, contactor appearance, clothing and equipment, 
neglect of duties, disorderly conduct, intoxication, prohibited activities, and criminal 
                                                                 
62 See Commission on Wartime Contracting, Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing 
Risks (2011), 
http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cwc/20110929213820/http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC_
FinalReport-lowres.pdf. 
63 See DoD, COR [Contracting Officer’s Representative] Handbook (2012) at 63, 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/cpic/cp/docs/USA001390-12_DoD_COR_Handbook_Signed.pdf. 
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actions.64 The contract emphasizes that the US government ‘reserves the right to direct the 
Contractor to remove an employee from the work site for failure to comply with the 
standards of conduct’.65 While sanctions are important, incentives in the form of 
performance-linked rewards are another way to encourage contractors to raise their 
standards.66 The US government has, thus, included positive and negative incentives in its 
World Wide Security Services Contract.67 Since it is easier to withhold incentive fees or 
reduce performance-based payments than to require reimbursements for failure to 
conform to a contract, incentives can be a very useful method for contractor management 
if implemented correctly.  
 
Conclusion 
The publication of the UN’s Guidelines on the Use of Armed Private Security Companies in 
2012 has been an important signal for an industry which still lacks international regulation. 
Nevertheless, research, experience and best practices from other clients suggest that there 
is still room for improvement. This article has made six recommendations which would 
enhance the UN’s control over security contractors and facilitate higher professional 
standards among the global security industry more generally: (1) broadening the scope of 
the regulations to include unarmed PSCs, (2) clarifying the conditions for the use of 
security guards, (3) specifying standards and training requirements, (4) expanding contract 
management capabilities, (5) revising the UN’s perfor-[490]mance assessment process, and 
(6) developing an effective sanctions regime for contractor noncompliance and 
misconduct. 
Notwithstanding these recommendations it must be noted that guidelines, rules 
and regulations are only as good as their implementation. Few international clients have 
                                                                 
64 See US, Blackwater, Triple Canopy, and DynCorp –Contract with the U.S. State Department, World Wide 
Protective Services Contract (2007), at Appendix Q to Section C ‘Standards of Conduct’, 
http://r.m.upi.com/other/12216818791223.pdf. 
65 Id. 
66 See for instance US White House, Best Practice for Performance-Based Contracting, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/procurement_guide_pbsc.  
67 See US, Triple Canopy - World Wide Protective Services Contract (2011), at 21, 
http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/industry_initiatives/contracts/dos_contract_triplecanopy_s-aqmpgd-05-
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imposed systematic or significant penalties on companies which have fallen short of 
contractual obligations and regulations during the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Even the US government, which this article has cited repeatedly for best practice in the 
contractual governance of PSCs, has been reluctant or unable to strictly enforce its 
regulations and management guidelines. 68 Among the main reasons for weak 
implementation are insufficient contractor management capabilities which can be 
deployed abroad and a growing dependence upon major security contractors. This has 
given the wrong signal to PSCs. Contractor fraud, waste and abuse have become major 
concerns in international missions. Although there have been efforts to develop industry 
self-regulation and third party certification through the ICoCA and the ISO PSC 
management standards, the failure of these regulations to set strict and clear standards for 
operations and training puts the onus on back on the clients. By demanding and enforcing 
high professional standards for security services the UN can serve as a role model for 
others.       
                                                                 
68 See GAO, Contingency Contracting: Agency Actions to Address Recommendations by the Commission on 
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